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Leaders, Regimes, and Political Instability

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Propositions from

Leaders, Regimes and Political Instability
Shu Yu

1. Leaders influence policies and the development path of their country. (Chapter 1)
2. In the decade following a successful coup, the poorest countries have higher growth rates while the richer countries have lower growth rates in comparison to the growth rates after a failed coup. (Chapter 2)
3. Political instability caused by coup attempts prompts the ruling elite to select less educated leaders with more military experiences. (Chapter 3)
4. Political stability can contribute to economic growth indirectly by motivating the ruling elites to choose more educated leaders. (Chapter 3)
5. Under a revolutionary threat, a leader's economic competence can be detrimental to his political survival. (Chapter 4)
6. The detrimental effect of economic competence on political survival disappears as the size of the winning coalition expands. (Chapter 4)
7. Foreign-educated leaders vote less in line with the U.S. at the United Nations General Assembly than domestically educated leaders. (Chapter 5)
8. "Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better." --- Samuel Beckett.
9. The most active thing about me is my imagination---Garfield.
10. I read thousands of biographies for this thesis.